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Abstract 
 
This article looks at the relationship between SWFs and their recipient countries, with a focus 
on the impact it may have depending on the nature of the objectives pursued by the SWF 
from the perspective of a principal-agent framework. In particular, when the SWF has 
multiple objectives, there is a risk that signals are misinterpreted and lead to misguided 
reactions by authorities in the recipient country. Thus, hard to interpret signals do not provide 
a sufficient case for imposing constraints on the SWF. However, we will show that requiring 
the SWF to invest through intermediary asset managers may foster cooperation, especially 
when the objectives of the SWF and of the authorities are closely aligned. SWFs may also 
alleviate the concerns in recipient countries by acting as an investor (and accepting the funds) 
of other SWF and non-SWF investors. 
 
  
                                                 
1 Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, the Office in Europe of the IMF, and the 
Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF, respectively. We have benefited from comments from E. 
Barot, M. El-Gamal, A. Ferrière, J. Pihlman, and H. van der Hoorn. The views expressed in this article are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Only a little while ago, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) were seen by many as the newest 
malignant instrument of state-sponsored capitalism on the global financial stage. SWFs, with 
large assets that were projected to rise rapidly on the back of rising commodity prices and 
widening global imbalances, were expected to invade and occupy financial markets and take 
them hostage for the unfriendly objectives of their mother governments. There is not much 
empirical evidence to support these concerns and, in fact, thus far, SWFs have generally 
behaved in a non-controversial way. In international fora where these issues are being 
debated, many are not surprised by this and expressed serious doubts when others feared that 
SWFs would pursue an objective function that would be vastly at odds with the objectives of 
other economic actors operating in the host country, and in particular that profit 
maximization would not be at the core of their strategy.2 Yet, the concerns were sufficiently 
strong to have led to calls from many quarters for more regulation of SWF operations 
through a number of means.3 
 
Fortunately, with improved information, persistent communication efforts by SWFs to 
explain their own activities, the preparation of a voluntary set of best practices (known as the 
Santiago Principles),4 and efforts by various international organizations (principally the IMF 
and the OECD) to clarify the rules and regulations governing SWFs’ investments, tempers 
have cooled. Perhaps more importantly, with the global financial crisis unfolding, other 
issues have taken center stage. Also, SWFs have lost some of their portfolio value due to the 
global asset price decline, and many have turned inward in an attempt to save their domestic 
economies through increased support for local banks or purchases of domestic assets.  
 
So, was the debate about SWFs all about nothing? We do not think so. Although many of the 
fears about sovereign funds have been exaggerated, SWFs do pose important issues for 
regulation, certainly as foreign investors and as key players in the economies where they 
operate, and also, more simply and irrespective of the location of their activities, as players 
whose characteristics are not fully known to other economic actors. That many SWFs have 
turned inward during the crisis is certainly not an argument against looking more deeply in 
these issues. Besides, the recent crisis has heightened global concerns about risk management 
of all financial institutions, especially systemic ones. There are indications that at least some 
SWFs have already started to make their comeback and, as the crisis recedes, their operations 
in foreign markets are likely to quickly accelerate. This will likely revive concerns and 
misgivings in recipient countries. 
                                                 
2 Others have also argued that, far from being very sophisticated, SWF managers were actually not aware of 
their potential impact or reluctant, for reasons of “image,” to activate all the leverages that are at their disposal.  
3 See, for example, Kimmit (2008).     
4 See International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008). 
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Before we move further, let us detail some of the key issues surrounding SWFs operations.5 
Concerns in recipient countries about SWFs have generally been about their ownership by 
foreign sovereigns (which may have non-commercial, perhaps strategic, motives for 
investment and generally raise the role of governments in economic activity and its 
distortionary impact on business decisions); their size (which may unduly affect asset prices 
and financial stability in host countries); and the transparency of their operations. 
Notwithstanding the recent and temporary decline in foreign-based operations, it is clear that 
the issue of governance in countries receiving SWF investments will remain relevant for a 
long time, would it be only because some key operations are locked-in. 
 
SWFs have also raised important issues in their home countries although these concerns are 
quite different in nature. The reason is that, irrespective of their location, SWFs can serve one 
or a combination of the following functions: stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve 
management corporations, developments funds, or contingent pension reserve funds (see 
IMF, 2008, p. 5). Accordingly, it is clear that, even when they operate at home, SWFs raise a 
number of key concerns for their sovereign owners.6 Unfortunately, the principal-agent 
model is not very well suited to this scenario and, while there may be some lessons to be 
drawn, we will not focus on them in this article.. 
 
We will rather focus on the concern that SWFs’ operations may (but need not) distort the 
decision-making process and governance of the firms they invest in (even though it is not 
unique to them), thereby harming the national interest of the recipient country—even leaving 
security-related concerns aside. At the root of this concern is the lack of trust among all 
parties in the objectives (the utility function) pursued by the others. This implies that 
perceptions and the difficulty in interpreting the actions of one party will affect the 
interactions between the SWF and the recipient country. This may lead to a lack of trust that 
is not necessarily justified. To illustrate this, this article looks in detail at the possibility that 
the SWF invests in the recipient country with legitimate (i.e., not related to strategic or 
“unfriendly” motives) objectives that are hard to interpret because they are not necessarily 
associated with short-term profit maximization. For example, the SWF could invest in order 
to learn more about a certain business. In that case, it is difficult for authorities in the 
recipient country to accurately interpret the signals sent by the SWF through its actions. 
                                                 
5 Das et al.  discuss this and many other concerns raised by SWFs’ operations. They also elaborate on the 
rationale for the Santiago Principles and how they seek to allay those concerns. 
6 First, as a public investor, they must properly invest public funds and secure adequate risk-adjusted returns. 
Second, SWFs need to make sure their investments are immune from undue domestic political interference. 
Third, because of their size, their activities need to be well coordinated with the county’s overall 
macroeconomic policies, in particular with the activities of other actors tasked with the implementation of 
macroeconomic objectives (e.g., the central bank). And fourth, just as we mentioned in the case of the SWF 
operating overseas, there is the possibility that some of the multiple objectives pursued by the manager of the 
SWF may not be compatible with those of the other domestic economic actors. For example, the finance 
minister of a centralized economy may have misgivings about the profit-maximizing instincts of the SWF 
manager. As we have already mentioned, these issues have become more relevant in recent times as SWFs have 
been asked by their governments to shift some of their focus to their domestic economies. 
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The article is organized as follows Section II discusses the foreign operations of SWFs that 
may create the need for regulation through an external fund manager. Section III provides the 
outlines of an analytical framework. Section IV discusses the scope for regulation under 
different assumptions about the information set of the agents involved. Section V 
complicates the basic model from Section III by introducing agents with multiple objectives, 
thus increasing the risks that signals are misinterpreted by recipient countries. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II.   REGULATING THE SWF OPERATING OVERSEAS THROUGH AN EXTERNAL FUND 
MANAGER 
For a variety of reasons, countries regulate domestic financial companies. By becoming 
active in a foreign country, some or all of the activities of a SWF also become subject to 
regulations imposed by the recipient government. While generally encouraging foreign 
investment, many recipient countries tend to be more suspicious of SWF activities than they 
are of domestic firms, as they fear that the SWF may somehow find a way to circumvent the 
regulatory process, if it is not actively trying to avoid scrutiny. 
 
Hence, various propositions have been made to regulate SWFs, including through imposing 
upper limits on ownership and/or voting rights; prohibitions on SWFs investments in 
“sensitive” areas, and subjecting their operations to a specific set of procedures. There is a 
clear trade-off for the recipient country, however. If a SWF brings economic benefits to the 
recipient country (as most have argued), limiting its room for maneuver through more 
regulations than is typically applied to domestic firms engaged in similar activities may not 
be wise: beside the extra cost to the regulatory authorities (and the compliance costs to the 
SWF), the SWF will face additional constraints (some arguably not necessary) and, if there 
are too many, it could even forego the opportunity of operating in that country altogether. 
 
A more subtle idea that has received support is to ask a SWF wanting to invest not to do so 
directly but, instead, to go through a fund manager in the recipient country.7 By introducing 
an additional layer between the SWF and the company or companies where the money will 
be invested, the hope is that the probability of detrimental activities would be reduced for two 
main reasons: the scope for collusion between the SWF and the target company or undue 
influence by the SWF on that company would be more limited; and investment funds tend to 
be more tightly regulated than other commercial activities. Another approach for allaying the 
concerns of recipient countries about the possible non-commercial motivations of SWFs has 
been recently initiated by Temasek of Singapore. Temasek has taken steps to set up a more 
general fund which would also take investments from other SWFs and non-SWF investors. 
Through this approach Temasek and its partners could in effect signal to recipient countries 
that their investments involve resources from diverse investors with different political 
                                                 
7 See Gibson and Milhaupt (2008). 
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interests, thus allaying concerns about non-commercial objectives of their investments, and 
clearly greater focus on commercial objectives.8 
 
In the next two sub-sections, we look at the proposal to use an external manager by 
considering the case of an intermediary local fund.9 We use principal-agent theory for this. In 
such a context, and broadly speaking (this important aspect of the model is discussed in detail 
in the next section), both the regulatory authorities (or a trusted domestic investor) and the 
SWF become the principals of the local fund (the agent). As is standard in game theory, the 
strategy of each principal is to induce the agent to act in such a way that the resulting output 
maximizes the principal’s utility. In doing so, the principals interact with and learn more 
about each other. In other words, the principals compete in trying to influence the actions of 
the agent in a way that could protect (as is hoped by those putting forward the proposal) the 
interest of the recipient country (for the principal associated to the regulatory authority or a 
domestic investor) and of the sovereign owner (for the principal associated with the SWF). 
We demonstrate that a key consideration in determining whether the approach is likely to 
have the desired results is the extent to which the objectives of the domestic regulator and the 
SWFs can be accurately interpreted and, if they can, whether they are complementary or 
antagonistic.  
 
 
III.   A SIMPLE MODEL 
A.   Theoretical considerations 
We now turn to a simple description of the model we intend to use as a tool to develop our 
ideas and develop the policy arguments. The model, inspired by Martimort (2006), will not 
be solved here, but some references are provided for the interested reader. The framework 
presented is a simple way to sketch the case of one agent being supervised by several 
principals (and we limit the model to two principals) and is very much in line with the typical 
model used in the field.  

Let us assume that two principals (Pi, i=1,2) have an objective function Si(q), where 
q=q(q1,q2) is the output of the agent. In return, each principal makes a transfer ti to the agent. 
The utility Vi of each principal is given by: 
 
Vi = Si(q) – ti;  (i = 1,2).  
 
The utility, U, of the agent is given by the transfers received from both principals minus the 
effort it makes to produce q. It is further assumed that the agent is more or less efficient with 
an intensity , so that the cost C(q) of producing q affects his utility as follows: 
                                                 
8 See “Temasek to Launch $4bn Investment Division,” Financial Times, February 10, 2010. 
9 In the rest of the text, we will indifferently use “domestic” or “local” to refer to the recipient country. 
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U = t1 + t2 – C(q); 
 
where the term C(q) can be interpreted as the opportunity cost to the agent of producing q or 
in managing a company F on behalf of its principals in such a way that F produces q.  can 
be interpreted as the agent’s type (e.g., efficient or not) and this parameter may or may not be 
known to the principals. As detailed below, we can then respectively refer to a case of perfect 
or imperfect information. The model is sketched in Figure 1 (where company F has not been 
included). 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note that the way we formulate the utility function of the agent is very 
general. In fact, we allow for the possibility that each principal i enters into a contract with 
the agent on a specific component of the output that matters to him. We call this quantity qi (i 
= 1, 2) with q=q(q1,q2). If we further assume that principal i can only observe qi and is not 
able to observe qj, the output going to the other principal, we have the case of a private 
agency. If the contract is on the whole output q=q(q1, q2), we have the case of a public 
agency. In both cases, as we discuss in the next subsection, the principals interact with each 
other via the contracts that they offer to their common agent. We show that the ability of the 
regulatory body (or the domestic fund) to constrain the SWF depends on whether the agency 
is private or public. For the cost function, this distinction is not necessary because the agent 
is assumed to have full information about it. Yet, C(q) can play a role in the results as we 
discuss later. 
 
B.   Some considerations on the basic assumptions 
We now discuss the main elements of the model relevant for our purpose: 
 
 First, who are the principals? Because the P-A model with two principals assumes a 
transfer to the agent, we cannot, technically, associate the regulatory authority to a 
principal. Instead, we should assume that the “domestic” principal is a local financial 
institution in which the authorities have full trust while the other principal is the 
SWF. Note that this simplification could affect the results. The reason is that between 
the regulatory authority (which would become an additional, main principal as shown 
in Figure 2) and the domestic fund (the domestic principal), there would also exist a 
Principal 1 Principal 2
(Host country) (Foreign SWF)
Agent
(Domestic fund)
(Type θ known or not)
Figure 1: The SWF invests in a domestic fund
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P-A relationship where the domestic fund is in fact an agent of the regulatory 
authority. Similarly, there would be a P-A relationship between the domestic fund 
(the agent in Figure 1) and the domestic company F where money is ultimately 
invested. Just as in the other case, the domestic fund, agent of principals 1 and 2, 
would itself become one of the principals of company F. Yet another (realistic) 
complication would be to take into account the P-A relationship that necessarily 
exists between the SWF and its sovereign owner (not included in Figure 2). 
Unfortunately, we cannot include these complex features in the model because 
cascade P-A relationships have not been studied in the theoretical literature (although 
Mookherjee (2006) provides a qualitative discussion of such models). Hence, we 
associate the domestic principal to the “government” or to the “domestic fund” as the 
case may be. We also neglect firm F, the domestic company, as a player. The simple 
situation presented in Figure 1 would then become as sketched in Figure 2:10 
 
 
 
 
 Second, who knows what? With complete information (section IV, A), the 
parameter  is known to both principals (see Figures 1 and 2). Intuitively, this 
corresponds to a situation where the regulatory authority feels confident that, through 
the domestic financial institution acting as “domestic principal,” it knows the 
characteristics of the agent or is in a position to monitor it sufficiently closely to be 
well informed about its behavior. This may not always be the case because the 
relationship between the regulatory authority and the domestic principal is not as 
                                                 
10 Note that there are several other P-A relationships that we neglect in this brief description and some can be 
very important, such as the relation between the foreign authorities as a principal and the SWF as its agent. [The 
example in the footnote (last part of the sentence) is a repetition of the main text.] 
Main principal
(Host country)
Principal 1 Principal 2
(Domestic agent (Foreign SWF)
of Main principal) 
Agent
(Domestic fund)
(Type θ known or not)
Domestic company F
Figure 2: The SWF invests in F through a domestic fund
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straightforward as we have assumed (as discussed in the previous bullet) or because 
there is less than perfect information (as we discuss in the next bullet). More 
importantly, and that is certainly a limitation of the simple assumption of perfect 
information, it is unlikely that the SWF will know an agent unilaterally selected by 
the regulatory authority as well as the economic actors of the recipient country, which 
implies an asymmetry between principals and this, to our knowledge, has not been 
studied in the literature. On the other hand, it could be realistic to assume that the 
SWF were allowed to choose an agent from a list of candidates deemed “acceptable” 
by the regulatory authority of the recipient country (perhaps a fund with ties to the 
sovereign country) and that would restore some balance in terms of information 
between the two principals. If the agent is sufficiently well known, we associate that 
case into that where our assumption of perfect information holds. In addition, there is 
an aspect of information that involves sending messages to and properly reading the 
intentions of the other players (and these can be interpreted wrongly or rightly). We 
discuss this in detail in section V; 
 
 Third, some issues in situations of imperfect information.11 In that case (section 
IV, B), the agent is not well known to either principals and will therefore retain some 
advantage in terms of its ability to extract surplus from both of them as they compete 
for its services. Once again, the idea is that, by inference, the regulatory authority will 
also face more uncertainty about the characteristics of the SWF. Intuitively, this 
appears to be a more realistic assumption than having known. For example, since  
is an aggregate measure, it is reasonable to assume that the Principal may be fully 
aware of some characteristics of the agent and ignore others, making its aggregate 
perception imperfect. In addition, as we will show, this model allows us to explore 
somewhat different issues, in particular the extent to which antagonistic or 
complementary utility functions by the principals can affect the outcome. This is 
important as a key consideration in the debates on SWFs is precisely the extent to 
which their objectives conflict with those of domestic actors. It is also important 
because an agent could be very good at certain tasks and less good at others while the 
global output q=q(q1,q2) received by the Principal is a combination of these tasks; 
 
 Fourth, the interpretation of q should not be restricted to the notion of quantity. 
In fact, q should be considered as an “output” which, in the context of SWFs’ 
operations could correspond to a portfolio that the principals ask the agent to manage 
on their behalf. This has been done in some papers (see for example Martimort, 
2006). An ambitious approach (not used in this article) would be to move away from 
the SWF as the Principal to consider that the Sovereign breaks up its SWF in a 
number of Agents, each with a comparative advantage in dealing with various aspects 
of portfolio management, in order to maximize its overall utility with the combination 
of their outputs (just as an investor strikes a balance between risks and returns). If it 
                                                 
11 In the model we consider, imperfect information corresponds to the case of adverse selection. We could also 
have looked at other variations of the model but, in the context of this article, the analysis would not yield 
substantially different conclusions. 
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can be done, such a model would provide a useful intuition into the optimal 
architecture of any organization, one obvious example being to determine the share of 
foreign reserves that the SWF would be allowed to manage while the central bank 
would retain responsibility over the rest. We briefly discuss this later in the article but 
do not model the issue; 
 
 Fifth, we restrict ourselves to the case where the agent has an obligation to work 
for both principals simultaneously. In the P-A literature, this is a special case 
because most models allow the agent to reject one contract and accept the other. 
However, doing so would not make much sense in this context. Indeed, we have ruled 
out the possibility that the SWF could be operating independently in the recipient 
country. Thus, if the agent rejects the possibility of working with the SWF (or the 
other way round), the SWF would simply not be allowed to operate; and 
 
 Finally, the welfare aspects of multi-principal models are generally not well 
defined because the objectives of each principal may overlap. Indeed, this implies 
that utilities cannot easily be added up and the theoretical literature has therefore 
neglected welfare analysis to instead focus on various notions of economic efficiency. 
We do not discuss these in the context of this article.  
 
 
IV.   RESULTS, INTUITION, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A.   Perfect information 
With perfect information, both principals know the characteristics of the common agent. In 
this model, it means that the parameter  is known to them. Let us first consider the case 
where the common agent operates as a private agency (i.e., deals with each principal i 
individually and negotiates on the specific output qi that only the parties involved can 
observe). Because the principals know  each of them is able to reduce its transfer to the 
point where the agent is indifferent between undertaking the task and rejecting the offer (an 
option we do not allow here as discussed earlier). Each principal behaves in the same way, 
and an equilibrium is reached when none of them wants to deviate. 
 
Even in this simple case, both principals interact with each other when they negotiate with 
the agent. The reason is that, during the negotiations, each principle can offer a contract in 
the form of a set of options to the agent. Most of these options will not materialize but they 
are nevertheless very important because they act as strategic signals to the other principal.12 
With both principals acting that way, the result may be inefficient outcomes, a somewhat 
unexpected result since there is otherwise perfect information in the game. 
 
                                                 
12 Parlour and Rajan (2001) provide a model of private agency where the principals lend money to a common 
agent who may default. In that case, however, the signaling between the principals is made via that possibility 
of default. This may also lead to inefficient equilibria. 
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In the case of a private agency, and from the point of view of the regulatory authority, the 
ability to monitor the activities of the SWF is limited by the fact that each principal 
negotiates directly with the agent and that the interactions between the principals are limited 
to sending signals to each other through a set of contracting options. Even with perfect 
information (and a private agency), it is therefore difficult to see how forcing a SWF to go 
through an agency with which it would be able to contract on its specific output would limit 
the scope for undesirable behavior. In fact, while it is possible that the signals sent by the 
other principal somehow affect (in a socially positive manner) the SWF, it is also equally 
likely that the signals sent by the SWF to the other principal have less desirable impact (if 
indeed the SWF has undesirable objectives). We argue below and in the subsection devoted 
to the case of imperfect information that this is indeed a risk for the recipient country.   
 
When the agent is public (i.e., both principals can negotiate on the whole output), there is 
clearly more scope for interaction between the two principals (through the agent). However, 
although these interactions can lead to more coordination (and that is presumably what the 
regulatory authority would like to see), there is also potentially more room for failing to 
coordinate properly (a situation the regulatory authorities would like to avoid). The latter is 
especially likely to happen when the SWF has objectives that diverge substantially from 
those of the recipient country. This is precisely the situation where the recipient country 
would want to increase its control over the activities of the SWF, and the model suggests that 
the ensuing lack of coordination leads to inefficient equilibria. If, on the other hand, the SWF 
has objectives that are broadly compatible with those of the recipient country, then using a 
common fund as a public agency is indeed likely to strengthen collaboration and therefore 
yield efficient equilibria. Overall, if the room for coordination is limited, a common agency 
is unlikely to help. If scope for coordination exists, a common agency may help reinforce it. 
 
Although we explore this issue in more detail (section V), it is worth noting that, in this game 
where signaling plays an important role, the signals sent by one principal (e.g., the SWF) 
could be misread by the other principal (e.g., the regulatory authority). This is likely to 
happen when two intrinsically different principals use their investments through their 
common agent as a tool to learn about each other. As we discuss in the next section, it seems 
that if (unfortunately) signals are misread, the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Once again, 
a common agency may help, but will be a more efficient instrument once some common 
ground has been established. 
 
B.   Imperfect information 
In the previous subsection, we assumed that the principals operate with perfect information 
about the agent’s type (). Intuitively, this means that the recipient country feels confident 
enough about the behavior of the local fund to put it in charge of handling the SWF’s 
activities. That the SWF also knows the agent perfectly is clearly a restriction but the 
theoretical models typically do not consider the case of asymmetry of information between 
principals. In spite of its limitations, however, our analysis helps to get an insight into the 
communication channels between both principals, even when the agent is “transparent.” 
 
Yet, we must also consider the case when the agent retains some informational advantage. 
Intuitively, it may be reasonable to assume that the authorities in the recipient country do not 
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really know the agent very well. For example, the recent crisis has revealed that regulatory 
authorities, in spite of the time and resources spent, may at times be taken by surprise at the 
type of financial products developed (and their valuation) by the most trusted names they 
were supervising, even those operating domestically.  
 
There is also another interpretation: the risk for existing principals that the agent changes its 
type when a new and unknown principal—the SWF—enters. Such an argument is often made 
in clubs: the new member of a club could alter the nature of the club. A similar argument has 
also been used by some observers to argue that the inclusion of China in the WTO would not 
only affect China’s approach to trade, but that it could also fundamentally change the way the 
WTO operates.  
 
One of the results obtained in multi-principal models with imperfect information is that the 
agent can strategically use his informational advantage to play one principal against the 
other, especially when they have conflicting objectives (see Laffont and Pouyet, 2004, for a 
formal approach). This is not surprising because this result was already obtained in perfect 
information, but the effect is indeed amplified when the agent retains private information. 
As the principals do not have full information, they have an incentive to monitor the agent in 
order to minimize his rent-seeking behavior. However, by monitoring the agent, each 
principal will (involuntarily) interact with the other principal and will therefore send strategic 
messages. Khalil et al. (2004) study that framework in the case of principals asking a 
common fund (the agent) to manage their investments. As with full information, the results 
depend on whether the agent is private or public (yet, even when the agent is private, the 
principals still interact with each other by performing some monitoring). The reason is that 
the monitoring may reveal to the other principal some information about the characteristics 
of the agent. When the agent is public, each principal (say A) may want to use monitoring in 
order to convince the other principal (say B) that the agent is not really good for B’s purpose. 
In that sense, although  is a one-dimensional parameter not designed to capture the multi-
dimensional aspects of the agent's skills, it also serves as a blurring device that prevents 
principals to correctly assess these skills (assumed given) in the different areas that each 
cares about. If B does the same, there may be (socially) too much monitoring. The opposite 
holds when the agent is private. 
 
Intuitively, this is an interesting conclusion for SWFs’ operations. The idea that there can be 
excessive monitoring is not always easily accepted (much like the idea that there can be 
excessive availability of information), and a local fund may indeed resent becoming the 
object of increased scrutiny by the domestic regulators and possibly by the SWF. The lesson 
is, therefore, that while some monitoring is beneficial, the regulatory authority may quickly 
fall into the trap of excessive monitoring. That this may also occur with a public agency 
where the principals have more opportunities to collaborate and also to compete with each 
other, suggesting that forcing a public agency approach would not be without pitfalls. 
Excessive monitoring could also be seen by SWF home countries as a protectionist step by 
the recipient country, creating demands in those countries for retaliatory steps against all 
foreign investment. 
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After having explored how imperfect information can affect the results already obtained with 
perfect information, we use the model to briefly look into other areas that could be relevant 
to the activities of SWFs. To keep the argument simple, we assume a private agency model 
where the principals are concerned by two different aspects of the activities of the common 
agent. 
 
From the social point of view, a key consideration is the extent to which the outputs q1 and q2 
are complementary or substitutes. Let us look at the private agency model again. Intuitively, 
the agent is tasked by both principals to produce the output that is relevant to each of them 
(q1 for P1 and q2 for P2). For example, the common agent could be asked by one principal to 
invest in a stock with certain return/variance characteristics, while the other principal would 
rather favor another stock, with different characteristics. In that situation, the principals 
compete with each other (when their respective outputs are substitutes) and they support each 
other (when their outputs are complementary) for the agent’s time and to capture the output. 
Technically, the activities are complements when C12 <0, and substitutes when C12 >0, where 
Cij denotes the cross derivatives of the cost function introduced in section III. It is easy to 
show that an increase in activity q1 triggers a decline in activity q2 when goods are 
substitutes, while the reverse holds when they are complements. Complementarity could be 
interpreted as a situation where the SWF has “friendly” objectives that do not conflict with 
those of the recipient country. 
 
There is one general lesson that can be drawn from such imperfect information models. 
Principal i always tries to induce the agent to do more for it (of qi) and less for the other 
principal (j). This is done by offering to the agent signals and incentives aimed at convincing 
principal j that the agent is not good at performing the task that j cares for (qj). When outputs 
are substitutes (or compete with each other), this behavior leads to output distortions as both 
play the same game and successfully manage to reduce the output for the other. When 
outputs are complementary, the game does not lead to a substantial loss in overall output. 
 
Intuitively, the extent to which the objectives of the regulatory authority and the SWF 
conflict (substitutes) or reinforce (complement) each other is, therefore, an important 
consideration as already noted in the introduction. Not surprisingly, there will be fewer 
distortions with complements and the recipient country is therefore right to feel more 
comfortable with the arrival on its territory of a SWF with objectives that do not conflict with 
the domestic ones. Once again, however, all these results depend on how each player 
interprets (rightly or wrongly) the signals sent by the others. We now show, using one 
example, how even good intentions can be misinterpreted, and lead to a loss of efficiency. 
 
V.   PRINCIPAL-AGENT PLAYERS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES  
While formally assuming that players maximize some general form of utility function, 
principal-agent models are often limited to profit maximization, as we have already 
indicated. Yet, some of the key issues emerging from the debates on SWF activities suggest 
that there are suspicions (authorities in recipient countries, think tanks, and even sovereign 
authorities) about the motives of SWFs, even though achieving some level of profits must 
clearly be an important component of a more complex utility function. Mostly, the discussion 
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in this section will be relevant to the SWF operating in a recipient country, although some of 
the issues would also be relevant to the SWF operating domestically, as we just discussed. 
 
In reviewing the various objectives that a SWF could pursue, it appears that some of them 
could be characterized as involving what we could coin as a “learning by investing” process. 
The idea is that by investing in a line of business, the SWF will learn about its activities and 
can in turn report to its sovereign and provide it with useful information (irrespective of 
whether such learning is aimed at strategic commercial, security, or simply developmental 
purposes). This “learning by investing” is in contrast to the well researched field of “learning 
by doing” where costs keep decreasing with the cumulative quantity of goods produced (see, 
for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or Tirole (1988). If one of the players (be it a 
principal or an agent) is pursuing multiple objectives in the short run, these would probably 
not be compatible with short-term financial objectives, but could well be compatible, in the 
long run, with standard (although enlarged) financial objectives. In other words, the agent is 
“investing” in the short run for a long run payoff that the host country may find difficult to 
define or even understand at the time of the investment. In such a framework, the signals 
received by the other players (i.e., information on their action) will be hard to interpret. 
When signals are not read correctly, any move could lead to suboptimal reactions by other 
players and therefore to suboptimal outcomes from the point of view of the other players 
(including the agent and the principal). There is clearly a possibility that such situations 
could occur when SWFs operate in a host country (but this can also arise in the case of a 
SWF operating domestically as mentioned in the previous section). We have touched on this 
issue in the context of a model with two principals and one agent. Yet, for tractability, we 
will restrict the model in this section to one principal and one agent in the first instance, 
before briefly moving to the case of several principals. 
 
A.   The case of one principal 
In order to illustrate how such learning by investing can take place, we introduce a simple 
example. We assume that a SWF acts as a principal who wishes to invest in each period (time 
is discrete) in one of two funds, denoted by j, with j = A, B. The financial returns from 
investing in either fund are stochastic and denoted by Rj, j = A, B. We also assume that the 
principal can acquire some private additional benefit Tj from investing in any of these funds 
(e.g., control or acquisition of information). Again, this information can be directly related to 
the profitability of the fund or to more general benefits that the principal wishes to acquire. 
We further assume that the principal is facing uncertainty and the benefit Tj is therefore 
modeled as a latent variable (not observable directly by the principal) which can take two 
values normalized to 0 or 1, without loss of generality. The possible realizations of Tj are 
denoted by tj = 0 (referred to as “bad outcome”) or tj = 1 (referred to as “good outcome”). 
The words “good” and “bad” are arbitrary. We assume that the underlying process generating 
the good and bad outcomes is stationary and unknown. 
 
We assume that the principal is facing uncertainty, as it does not know the probabilities of 
occurrence of the good and bad outcomes. However, he can reduce this uncertainty, but at a 
cost. We denote by pj, the probability that the outcome is unfavorable Prob{tj = 0} = pj with 
fP(pj), the prior belief, in other words the probability distribution for parameter pj. Without 
any extra (prior) information, it is reasonable to assume the simplest possible prior, i.e., that 
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the distribution is uniform (fP(pj)=1). One extreme case occurs when the random variables Rj 
and tj  are perfectly correlated; the other extreme case is when the random variable Rj and tj  
are independent, so that a large or a low return on investment j tells nothing about the value 
of t. 
 
If there is perfect correlation (between financial benefits and the extra benefits), acquisition 
of information by the principal is required in order to maximize long-term objectives. If there 
is independence, acquisition of information and profit maximization correspond to two 
different objectives faced by the principal in a multi-criteria problem. 
 
We have assumed that the investment occurs in a discrete time framework and, in each 
period, the principal decides where to allocate his funds (the choice is discrete, i.e., either 
fund A or fund B is chosen). The proposed model is dynamic and captures the time lag 
associated with the concept of “learning by investing.” It works as follows: after each period, 
the principal observes a realization of the random variable Tj, and adjusts his priors 
accordingly. Note that the observation of fund j is costly since the principal has to invest in 
this fund in order to be allowed to have access to a realization of tj. After n observations of 
the realization of Tj, the distribution of prior has changed and is determined by the observed 
number of good and bad outcomes; this provides a sufficient statistics for making the next 
decision. This problem is difficult and has no closed form solution, but rigorous numerical 
solutions exist. We provide some of the computations related to this problem in Appendix 2. 
 
Investing in a fund can therefore play a dual role for the SWF: first, it gets some financial 
return together with some private benefit; second, it gets access to information about the 
quality of the fund (the value of p). Some simple cases are easy to solve. 
 
Assume, for example, that returns and private information are perfectly correlated. To fix 
ideas, assume that the value of pA for fund A is known, we then have a “one armed bandit 
problem.” It can be shown that in this case, the best strategy is either: (a) the principal always 
invests in fund A and never changes; (b) the principal invests in fund B, and if there are too 
many bad outcomes, it stops and switches to fund A forever; (c) the principal invests in fund 
B and never switches. Case (b) is the most interesting one, and illustrates what is meant by 
“learning by investing.” The choice of fund B can be interpreted as follows: the principal is 
ready to lose possibly some money to find out if fund B will be a good source of private 
information. After exploring that possibility for some time, he decides (in case (b)) that this 
is probably not the case and switches to another fund (he may be wrong ex-post, but this is 
nevertheless the best decision, ex ante). Stopping rules must be designed and computed on 
the basis of past observations so that the principal knows when he should switch; although 
they are quite complex (they are known as the Gittins Indexes after Gittins (1979) and 
(1989)), they can be computed analytically.13 In more complex cases, the quality of the 
private information for both funds is unknown. When that happens, shifts by the SWF from 
                                                 
13 Note that this problem, known as the “bandit problem” already evoked at the beginning of this section, has 
been treated in the literature only for risk neutral players (with one exception by Chancelier, De Lara and de 
Palma (2009) who consider the case of players who are risk-averse). 
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fund A to fund B (and vice versa) can always occur because a sufficiently long series of bad 
outcomes can discourage the principal from continuing to invest in the fund originally 
selected. 
  
B.   The case of several principals 
In the previous subsection, we have considered the case of a single principal. When there are 
several principals willing to invest in the same funds, the situation is far more complex. The 
principals will observe each other, and the rational SWF behaving the way we have just 
described sends a signal to the other principals when he decides to switch from one fund to 
another. Although these signals are hard to interpret, they cannot be ignored. Since all these 
signals convey some information, they should (and will) be interpreted by the other investors. 
However, the solution is not easy to compute—a point we have made earlier--since the 
acquisition of some share of a fund could be explained by several considerations that are hard 
to disentangle: a principal could select a fund in the short run investment stage to acquire 
knowledge about the potential private information conveyed by this fund. Or he may just be 
interested in the return on this investment. Moreover, the correlation between the private 
information that two principals could extract also matters in the discussion.  
 
So far, we have assumed that the domestic fund manager (the agent) is not acting 
strategically. Things are more complicated when the agent ceases to be a passive player who 
ignores that its choices convey some information to the principals. We have also seen in 
section IV.A that, even with perfect information, the agent may be in a position to play one 
principal against the other. Assuming a passive agent may be realistic in situations where the 
number of principals is large, but it will generally not be the case when there are only a few. 
In addition, if the principals are in small number, they will be aware that their actions are 
observed and, in turn, may benefit from acting strategically. This is usually true (as discussed 
in Martimort (2006)), and we have already seen that signals outside equilibrium can play a 
critical role in the game with single objectives. This discussion suggests that, with multiple 
objectives, the signals sent by any player (one of the principals or the agent) can be 
significantly blurred and the ability of the other players to interpret them will therefore be 
reduced.  
 
Clearly, the fees charged by the agent will depend on the value of its private information, 
which we have called  in the rest of the article. As is usually assumed, this parameter will 
remain unknown to the principals, but while the value of the information ( j) gathered by the 
principals is unknown to the agent, the latter can learn from their investment behavior (via 
some market study, for example). This problem is very complex and has not been addressed 
in the literature. However, in simple cases, it can be shown that, when principals have multi-
criteria objectives, the agent may be able to extract a positive rent (even under full 
information) that it would not be able to extract otherwise (a result similar to that obtained in 
Martimort (2006) with single objective). This is worrying from the policy standpoint since 
the outcome of forcing a SWF to operate through a local fund (when it is suspected that the 
preferences of the SWF depart strongly from those of the regulatory authority), could be to 
increase the profits of the common agency and make it move to an inefficient outcome. Once 
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again, channeling the investment activities of the SWF through a domestic agency may not 
always increase efficiency. 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
[Can one say that the external fund manager strategy works least when it is needed most?] 
Some observers have suggested that SWFs could partly allay the concerns about possible 
political motivations behind their activities by investing through fund managers located in the 
recipient countries. We examine the usefulness of this proposal by using agency theory. The 
results show that, under reasonable assumptions, the use of fund managers may not 
necessarily address these concerns. This result holds in a situation when an SWF pursues 
only its profit maximization motives, but also more when it pursues multiple objectives, 
including “learning by investing.” These results indicate that recipient countries may try to 
address their concerns through more direct regulation, which may add to the protectionist 
trends we observe in many countries. To avoid this, SWFs and recipient countries need to 
work toward greater organizational and operational transparency. The recent creation by 
Temasek of a new investment division that hopes to seek backing from institutional investors 
(and possibly the general public, down the road) may prove to be a useful example of 
innovations that would help allay the concerns of recipient countries. 
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Appendix 1 
 
A simple model of one principal with two agents can be formalized as follows: 
 
Let y be the output, xi the effort made by each agent and ai.y the compensation paid by the 
principal to each agent, the utility of each agent is given by: 
 
Ui (ai, xi, y) = aiy – (xi)²/2   (i = 1,2). 
 
The utility of the principal is given by:  
 
U(a1, a2, y) = y – a1y – a2y. 
 
The production function is given by: 
 
Y = x1m1 + x2m2 
 
when the efforts of each agent towards the overall objective are complementary. And,  
 
Y= (m1 + m2).x1(m1/(m1+m2)).x2(m2/(m1+m2)) 
 
when the contributions to production are substitutes. In all cases, the social welfare is given 
by: 
 
V(x1, x2, m1, m2) = y – x12/2 – x22/2. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Denote by Nb, the number of periods a bad realization (tj = 0) is observed. Then, the a priori 
distribution of t, conditional on the observation of k=Nb bad realizations for j over n 
observations of j, can be computed according to Bayes’ rule. Some standard computations 
show that:    
௉݂ ௞⁄ ሺ݌; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇ሻ ൌ ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻܥ௞௡݌௞ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௞. 
The expectation of the probability tj conditional of Nb = k is:  
ܧ൫݌௝; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇൯ ൌ ݇ ൅ 1݊ ൅ 1. 
Note that, as expected, this converges to k/n, as k and n tend to infinity.  
Denote the benefit conditional (on the realization t j) of the principal, during one period by: 
Bj(t j) = U(rj +  j ; t j), where U(.,.) the utility function of the principal is based on the return 
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of fund j (j=A or B) and on the private information provided by this fund. For example, if the 
principal is risk neutral, and if there is a constant tradeoff in the two criteria, then its utility is 
linear, and Bj(t j) =  rj +  t j. If the principal is risk averse, the utility function will have a 
non-linear specification, such as constant relative risk aversion or constant absolute risk 
aversion. With risk neutral principals, the unconditional benefit of the principal, after n 
investment periods (observations) is then: 
 
ܤ௝ሺ݊ሻ ൌ න ሾ݌ܤሺ0ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܤሺ1ሻሿ ௉݂ോ௞ሺ݌; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇ሻ݀݌
ଵ
଴
 
 
This expression is linear in the probability. It can therefore be simplified as follows:  
 
ܤ ൌ ܧ൫݌௝; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇൯ܤሺ0ሻ ൅ ൣ1 െ ܧ൫݌௝; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇൯൧ܤሺ1ሻ. 
 
The principal should then maximize the discounted value of the flows of benefits over the 
total investment period. 
 
Note that if the principal has some perception biases of the unknown probabilities, the 
expression will be non-linear in the probability:  
ܤᇱ௝ሺ݊ሻ ൌ න ሾݒሺ݌ሻܤሺ0ሻ ൅ ݓሺ1 െ ݌ሻܤሺ1ሻሿ ௉݂ ௞⁄ ሺ݌; ௕ܰ ൌ ݇ሻ݀݌
ଵ
଴
, 
 
where v(.) and w(.) denote the probability weighting functions. With no perception biases,  
v(.) and w(.) reduce to the identity. When v(.) and w(.) are non-linear, a closed-form solution 
for B(n), does not necessarily exist. However, numerical computations could still determine 
the switching points in the investment strategies.  
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